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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE OTHER CONSTITUTION
Michael Kent Curtis*
In this article, Professor Michael Kent Curtis examines how laws that shape the
distribution of wealth intersect with and affectpopularsovereignty andfree speech
and press. He presents this discussion in the context of the effect of the Other
Constitution on The Constitution. Professor Curtis begins by taking a close-up look
at the current campaign finance system and the concentration of media ownership
in a few corporate bodies and argues that both affect the way in which various
political issues are presented to the public, ifat all. Professor Curtis continues by
talking about the origins of our constitutional ideals of popular sovereignty and
free speech andpress and how the centralization of economic power has limited the
full expression of these most basic of democratic values throughout American
history. Next, he analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the
controlling precedent with respect to the constitutionality of limitations on
campaign contributions. Finally, Professor Curtis concludes that the effect of the
Other Constitution on The Constitution requires a Television Tea Party and a
government role in the financing ofpolitical campaigns.
[Wihere the law is made by one man, there it may be unmade by one man, so that
the man is not governed by the law, but the law by the man; which amounts unto the
government of the man, and not of the law; whereas, the law being not to be made
but by the many, no man is governed by another man, but only by that which is the
common interest, by which means this amounts unto a government of laws, and not
of men.'
I. OUR TWO CONSTITUTIONS
This article is about money, politics, and the Constitution. But which
Constitution - the Constitution ratified in 1789 and amended twenty-seven times
or the Other Constitution? The Constitution proclaims popular sovereignty - the
idea that in this nation "We the People of the United States" are the ultimate source
of authority. It guarantees free speech and press. But there is another political
reality - the Other Constitution - that limits popular sovereignty and to a
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. Thanks to research
assistants Christopher Jennings and Jason Newman and to Tom Curtis and Professors Mark
Graber, Edward Foley, David Logan, Alan Palmiter, Michael Perry, David Shores, James
Wilson, and Ron Wright for comments on an earlier draft of this essay. They are not, of
course, responsible for shortcomings.
1 2 JAMES HARRINGTON, THE ART OF LAW GIVING IN THREE BOOKS (1659), in DIVINE
RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF POLITICALWRTING IN STUART ENGLAND 395-
96 (David Wooton ed., 1986).
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significant degree shapes how The Constitution works in fact.
I was led to think about the Other Constitution by reading a passage in de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America. De Tocqueville suggests that the laws of
inheritance ought "to be placed at the head of all political institutions; for they
exeicise an incredible influence upon the social state of a people, while political
laws show only what this state already is."2  De Tocqueville continued, "[w]hen
framed in a particular manner, [the law of inheritance] draws together, and vests
property and power in a few hands; it causes an aristocracy, so to speak, to spring
out of the ground."3 Formed on other principles, it "divides, distributes, and
disperses both property and power"- it produces a democracy." So de Tocqueville
saw American legislation ending the monopoly on inheritance enjoyed by the eldest
son as a powerful force producing democracy.
De Tocqueville wrote before the corporate form had become pervasive.
Because of its immortality, the corporation is not affected by the laws of
inheritance. As a result of this fact, limited liability for investors and the
prerogatives over corporate assets exercised by corporate managers, the invention
of the corporation has made possible "immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."5
One can generalize de Tocqueville's point. Laws and other factors that shape
the concentration of wealth and power are of great significance - though perhaps
de Tocqueville goes too far when he says they should be "placed at the head of all
2 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 47-48 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1956) (1945). For a modem scholar who has emphasized the distribution
of wealth as shaping the constitution of a state, see, for example, James Wilson, The
Unconstitutionality ofEliminatingEstate and Gift Taxes, 49 CLEv. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2001) (manuscript on file with author); James Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review,
44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 445 (1996); James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality
Education is Not Enough, 34 AKRON L. REV. 383 (2000).
3 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 48.
4 Id.
5 See generally Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,660 (1990). The
Austin case limited, at least somewhat, some earlier Court decisions. The Fourteenth
Amendment was written and adopted in response to state action depriving natural persons
of liberty and equality. It makes "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States
citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." (emphasis added) The
amendment then proceeds to prohibit states from depriving "any person" of life, liberty, or
property and any citizen of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The
Court has long held that corporations are not citizens. Still, in Santa Clara County v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), without the benefit of argument, the Court held that
corporations are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court struck down a state statute
that prohibited expenditure of corporate treasury funds on advocacy on initiative or
referendum ballot measures.
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political institutions."6 These laws and underlying circumstances that shape the
distribution of wealth and power are the Other Constitution. The Other Constitution
includes the tax laws, laws governing corporations, the antitrust laws, the
communications laws, and all those rules and understandings that legitimate the
concentration of private power.
Some old time thinkers thought the Other Constitution - the one we rarely talk
about as affecting democracy - was the one that really counted - that
constitutions like the one that we learned about in our high school civics course are
really far less significant.7 I think they were wrong. Both Constitutions are
important; they influence each other. The Other Constitution shapes and limits how
The Constitution we talk about works, and The Constitution shapes and limits the
Other Constitution.
The two Constitutions intersect dramatically at the juncture of money and
democratic processes. The Other Constitution powerfully affects two cherished
ideals of The Constitution - popular sovereignty and free speech and press. I will
first view free speech and popular sovereignty through the lens of the Other
Constitution - the one implied by the ideas of de Tocqueville, James Madison,9
and many others. Then I will turn to The Constitution's ideals of free speech and
popular sovereignty.
By paying attention to both Constitutions, perhaps we can bring the ideals of
The Constitution closer to reality. Ignoring the Other Constitution, or embracing
the view that it must be largely beyond government interference, leaves us in the
world of Anatole France and A. J. Liebling. France sardonically praised "[the law,
in its majestic equality, [which] forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges,
6 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 47. The wealth-democracy-free speech
conundrum has been widely recognized. See, e.g., MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIviLLIBERTARIANISM, 94-95 (Brandeis and Dewey),
136-40 (Chafee), 186-87 (Lindbolm); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1363, 1386-87 (1984).
" See, e.g., 2 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 395-417; see also Daniel Webster, Speech
on "Apportionment of the Senate" in the Massachusetts State Convention of 1820-1821, in
POLTICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 203 (Andrew C. Scott ed., 1960).
a See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, 364-411 (1988) (examining how the changes in the Southern electorate changed state
policy).
9 See James Madison, Parties, and James Madison,A Candid State ofParties, reprinted
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 504-05, 530-32 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); see also Mark
Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal
Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J., 731, 769-70 (1997) (discussing homestead and
similar legislation); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 354 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (arguing that in a large constituency there would be less danger of diversion of
a fit choice by "the intrigues of the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.").
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beg in the streets, or steal bread."'" A. J. Liebling said that "[fireedom of the press
is guaranteed only to those who own one.""
I. THE OTHER CONSTITUTION TODAY: ITS IMPACT ON
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND FREE SPEECH
A. Popular Sovereignty
Some may suggest that we need not worry about the impact of money on our
democratic system because financial contributions - like votes - reflect popular
support for candidates.' 2 A quick review of the facts shows why this view is
erroneous. According to the Congressional Research Service, in 1995 the top one
percent of households in America held about thirty-nine percent of household
wealth. " The top ten percent held about seventy-two percent of the wealth. 4 The
bottom forty percent of the households held two-tenths of one percent of household
wealth." Figures for income distribution are similar, but the gap is less
pronounced.'6 Much of the economic power of the nation is concentrated in those
who manage affairs of a few giant corporations. Today, with little government
interference, giant corporations regularly combine with each other to form even
larger centers of power. All these factors, of course, influence our present system
of campaign finance.
Obviously, the Other Constitution influences the flow of money to politicians.
Generally, the money comes from those who have most of it. In 1996, among
individuals, eighty percent gave nothing to Senate and congressional candidates.' 7
Only one-quarter of one percent gave congressional or presidential candidates over
$200 and one-tenth of one percent over $1,000.00.1' The effect of wealth is
10 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY (1894), at http://www.bartleby.com/66/37/
22937.html.
11 RICHARD KLUGER, THE PAPER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE N.Y. HERALD TRIB.
(1986), at http://www.bartleby.com/63/42/8242.html.
2 Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663,690 n.44 (1997).
"3 Brian W. Cashell, CRS Report for Congress, The Distrubution of Household Wealth
in the United States, CRS-3 (March 16, 2000).
14 Id.
1S Id.
16 Brian W. Cashell, CRS Report for Congress, The Distribution of Income in the United
States, CRS-4 (Oct. 31, 1999). In 1990-98, the top 20 percent of families have about 46
percent of family income and the top 40 percent had 69.5 percent. Id.
" The Big Picture: Where the Money Came From in the 1996 Elections, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/bigpicture/overview/bpowerview.htm. (last visited Feb. 28,
2001).
18 Id.
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mitigated somewhat by public funding of presidential campaigns and by public
funding for state offices established in some states.
In 1996, as in every other election year the Center for Responsive Politics has
tracked, the biggest source of campaign money - by far - was the business
community. 9 Overall, including contributions to candidates as well as soft money
donations to the parties, business outspent labor by a factor of 11:1 and ideological
groups by 19:1.20 Two-thirds of business money (totaling some $449.3 million)
went to Republicans, while ninety-two percent of labor money (totaling $49.3
million) went to Democrats.2'
Our present system of campaign finance and suggestions for reform are attempts
to respond to the influence of the Other Constitution on The Constitution - to
respond to the effect of concentration of wealth and power on democracy. But our
campaign finance laws are porous - in part as a result of judicial plastic surgery
designed to protect free speech values. Money for issue ads, spent by people or
groups that - in theory at least - do not coordinate their efforts with candidates,
is not considered a political contribution to the candidate. When donated to
political parties for "issue ads," such contributions are often called soft money. In
any case, at present, issue ads are largely beyond the reach of campaign finance
laws and rules. In the presidential election of 2000, soft money expenditures
directed at the presidential race (soft money spending by political parties on "issue
ads") exceeded regular spending by presidential candidates.22
To have a chance, politicians must raise a great deal of money. Most of the
money comes from the people who have most of it. The politicians therefore spend
lots of time with these people - in coffees, $5,000 handshakes, $25,000 dinners,
sleepovers at the White House and the Texas Governor's Mansion, etc.23 According
to Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor under President Clinton, politicians
unconsciously begin to see the world through the eyes of their wealthy
contributors.24 As he explained in a New Yorker article:
No policy has been altered, no bill or vote willfully changed. But,
inevitably, as the politician enters into the endless rounds of coffees, meals,
and receptions among the networks of the wealthy, his view of the world
is refrained .... Increasingly, the politician hears the same kinds of
I9 /d.
20 id.
21 id.
22 Peter Marks, Parties Playing a Larger Role in Election Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2000, at Al.
23 See, e.g., Jets' Owner Scores with Dubya, N. Y. POST, Jan. 9, 2001, at 6, available at
2001 WL 4375904; George Skelton, Sages of the Statehouse, COLUM. J. REv., July-Aug.
2000, at 50, 51, available at 2000 WL 12155823.
24 Robert B. Reich, Party Favors, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 1997, at 11-12.
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suggestions, the same voicing of concerns and priorities. The wealthy do
not speak in one voice... but they share a broad common perspective [on
things such as balancing the budget, opening trade routes, and cutting taxes
on capital gains]. Meanwhile, the politician hears only indirectly and
abstractly from the less comfortable members of society. The less
comfortable do vote, of course, though generally their rate of participation
is lower than that of the wealthy.25
When politicians cannot effectively run without a large campaign war chest and
most campaign funds come from a narrow segment of society, topics that are
seriously debated may be limited to those acceptable to large contributors. As
Robert Kuttner has written, "[w]hen money dominates politics, entire questions are
kept off the agenda." '26
It is fashionable to criticize Albert Gore, Jr., for raising money in Hollywood
and to criticize George W. Bush for raising money from the pharmaceutical
industry. But it is futile. Politicians, like the rest of us, operate within and respond
to a system, and by and large it is a system we have created.27 But the critics have
a point. Will laws and policy be made based on large political contributions? '8
Fund-raising practices threaten the fiduciary relation of elected officials to the
people - a bedrock of democratic theory. The solution to the problem is to change
the system rather than to demonize those who operate within it.
B. Free Speech Under the Other Constitution
Reform proposals can also be seen as an attempt to respond to the effect of the
Other Constitution on The Constitution's guarantee of free speech - the effect of
concentration of wealth and power on the system of freedom of expression. This
concentration is not simply the result of market forces. It is shaped by prior actions
that parceled out wealth and power, and by laws and governmental decisions that
continue to parcel out public resources to private parties. One example is the
5 Id; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 109 (1989).
26 ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LMrrs OF MARKETS
347 (1997); see also Jamin Raskin and John Bonafaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
Primary, I I YALE L. & POL'Y. REV. 273 (1993) (on how the wealth available to candidates
performs a de facto filtering system analogous to a primary election). For a detailed study
of how changing economic conditions and patterns of corporate support have moved
American politics to the right in spite of lack of such a basic shift in voter sentiment, see
THOMAS FERGUSON ANDJOELROGERS, RIGHTTURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11-39, 86-88, 100-13, 198-203 (1986).
27 See 2 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 101 (1971).
28 See, e.g., George Lardner, Jr. & Susan Schmidt, Attorneys General Raise Funds for
GOP: Corporations in State Suits Are Solicited, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at AI.
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exclusive use of the airwaves granted to holders of radio and television licenses.
Indeed, private wealth and power is, to a significant degree, created and protected
by our legal structure.29
Most constitutional law casebooks do not devote much attention to the Other
Constitution as it affects free speech. But journalists and teachers of
communication do, and they paint a disturbing picture." The present situation of
the mass media has been described by columnist Molly Ivins:
At the end of World War II, 80 percent of American newspapers were
independently owned. When Ben Haig Bagdikian published "Media
Monopoly" (Beacon Press) in 1982, 50 corporations owned almost all of
the major media outlets in the United States. That included 1,787 daily
newspapers, 11,000 magazines, 9,000 radio stations, 1,000 television
stations, 2,500 book publishers and seven major movie studios. Bythe time
Bagdikian put out the revised edition in 1987, that was down to 29
corporations. And now there are nine. They own it all.3
Well, not quite all. There are of course the university presses, etc. But as to the
mass media and the mass audience, Ivins' picture is largely correct.
The press itself enjoys extraordinary privileges and immunities because of its
crucial role in a democratic system. But today, television networks are divisions of
major corporations, and television, movie, video, radio, internet companies, and
newspapers are consolidated into vast media empires. The result is an extraordinary
concentration of power and an alarming increase in conflicts of interest.
Too often, professional journalistic values are subordinated to market values
to profit. Entertainment and stealth advertising masquerading as news stories
replace serious discussion of public affairs in most of the electronic media.32 Too
often television and radio report political campaigns as a horse race. The mass
media devote attention to trivial matters of style thought to impact largely
disengaged swing voters and devote much less to substantive discussion of
29 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT is, How IT WORKS, AND
WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 169-77 (2001) (on prior determinations of wealth and power as
affecting markets).
30 See generally DEAN ALFORD, MEGAMEDIA: How GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE
MASS MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (1998); BEN H.
BAGDIKJAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1987) (explanation of relevance); ROBERT W.
MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLrriCS IN DUBIOUS
TIMES (1999) (explanation of relevance); BillMoyers: Free Speech for Sale (PBS television
broadcast, June 8, 1999) [hereinafter Free Speech for Sale].
31 Molly Ivins, Three New Books Offer Suggestions for Fixing the Media Mess,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 2, 1999, at A4.
32 ALFORD, supra note 30, at 160-89.
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candidate records and proposals.33
These facts matter because a significant number of Americans get their political
news only from television, and even more get most of their news there.34 In any
case, access to television is crucial for politicians because of the remarkable amount
of time many Americans spend watching. In 1999, the television set was in use
about seven hours and twenty-four minutes per day in the average household.35
Women from age twenty-five to fifty-five spent over thirty hours per week viewing
television; men in the same age group over twenty-seven hours per week.36 For
women older than fifty-five, the figure jumped to over forty-one hours per week,
and for men older than fifty-five to more than thirty-six hours per week.37 In light
of these facts, it is not surprising that most Americans get the vast majority of their
political information from a few mass media outlets.
Because Americans get their information on public affairs from a very few
media outlets whose ownership is concentrated in a few corporate hands, control of
ABC by Disney or NBC by General Electric can distort the presentation of the news
- whether about nuclear power or environmental problems or the human rights
record of the Chinese. In a recent poll, some twenty-six percent ofjournalists admit
to engaging in self-censorship of news stories because of conflicts of interest
involving their news organization or its parent company, advertisers, and friends of
the boss.3' Forty-one percent admit to reshaping or softening stories.39 Some
owners of media empires have clear political predilections, and they see that their
views are reflected in their publications. As the number of owners shrinks, the
concern should grow.
The Walt Disney Corporation hopes to market its famous mouse and other
products in China, potentially a huge and lucrative market. The Chinese object to
3 See Local TV Coverage of the 2000 General Election, USC ANNENBERG SCHOOL FOR
COMMUNICATION (The Norman Lear Center Campaign Media Monitoring Project), Feb.
2001, at 9-14; ALFORD, supra note 30, at 173-82.
34 In 1992 the figure was forty-one percent who got their news exclusively from
television and eighty percent who got most of their news there. Reed Hundt, The Public's
Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters, 45 DUKE L.
J. 1089, 1102 (1996) (citing Survey: Public Prefers 7yson to Politics, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1992, at 13). As of 2000, one in three Americans get some of their news online. Internet
SappingBroadcast News Audience, athttp://www.people-press.org/mediaOOrpt. (last visited
Feb. 11,2001); http://www.people-press.org/mediaOOsec. 1 About forty percent ofthe thirty-
three percent who are on-line news consumers go to the Internet for political news. Id.
35 NIELSON MEDIA RESEARCH, 2000 REPORT ON TELEVISION 14 (2000).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Andrew Kohut, Self Censorship, Counting the Ways, COLUM. J. REV., May-June 2000,
at 42-43.
39 Id.
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films and news stories critical of how China treats Tibet.40 Will Chinese protests
affect how Chinese rule in Tibet is portrayed in future films or in the news? In
some cases, Chinese market power has already distorted the news. Rupert
Murdoch, the television and press baron, also wants to protect his Chinese market
to which he hopes to sell his soap operas, movies, and other products.4' His satellite
eliminated the BBC news because it was too critical of China's human rights
practices, and his publishing house broke a contract to publish a book by the last
British governor of Hong Kong because it was critical of China.4 (The author
found another publisher.)43
China has great economic power, but so do many multi-national corporations.
Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House, advised corporate executives to
use their economic and advertising power to keep viewpoints of which they
disapprove out of the mass media." A number of magazines now allow advertisers
to preview stories."5 As market values subordinate journalistic ones, strategic
defamation and product disparagement lawsuits also can be ever more effective in
keeping topics off the agenda.' A corporation whose main focus is on the bottom
line is more likely to avoid expensive litigation with powerful corporations and
controversy with powerful advertisers.47 As a result, critical stories that target
misdeeds by the powerful are less likely to appear in the news. Win or lose, the
suits have their effect because they are so expensive to defend.48
Big media has other serious conflicts of interest. When the tobacco companies
decided to oppose the amended version of the McCain tobacco bill, they spent
o Seth Faison, Dalai Lama Movie Imperils Disney's Future in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1996, at Al.
4" John Giddings, Murdoch's Beifing Love Feast, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 12,
1998, at 14, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Guardian (London) file.
42 Id.
43 Id. For an illuminating discussion of the effect of advertisers on the press and of
possible reform, see EDWIN C. BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
" Kevin Sack, Gingrich Attacks Media as Out of Touch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997, at
D21 (Gingrich suggested that if the electric light were invented today, the media would cite
Ralph Nader on the dangers of electrocution and another source on the threat to the jobs in
the candle industry.).
4' G. Bruce Knecht, Magazine Advertisers Demand Prior Notice of Offensive Articles,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1997, at 1.
46 Is It a Crime to Criticize Food?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Sept. 1996, at 6.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also Geraldine Fabrikant, Fox Drops Drama Based on Charge Against
Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1998, at Cl; cf. Michael Kent Curtis, Monkey Trials:
Science, Defamation, and the Suppression ofDissent, 4 WM. & MARY BiLLRTS. J. 507,530-
44, 557-65 (1995). See generally Tom Goldstein, Does Big Mean Bad, COLUM, J. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 52.
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thirty-five million dollars in television ads attacking the bill.49 Viewers were
regaled with pictures of a cuckoo bird coming out of a clock while an announcer
solemnly announced that it was cuckoo time in Washington - with huge new taxes
on working people, sixty new bureaucracies, etc.5° Kathleen Hall Jamison of the
Annenburg School of Communication says that the ads lacked context and were
misleading.5 (They did not explain, for example, the purpose of the taxes and the
use to which the money was to be put. The charge of sixty new bureaucracies cited
an apparently impartial source. In fact, the source was quoting a speech made by
a tobacco company executive.)5 2
While they were reaping millions of dollars from the tobacco company ads
against the McCain bill, the television and cable corporations did almost no
reporting about the massive advertising campaign. They did little to raise issues
about the credibility of these ads or to put them in the larger context of the issues
at stake. 3 But perhaps that is asking too much. Few of us are inclined to bite the
hand that feeds us. So the ads of big tobacco about the McCain bill went
unanswered and the bill was defeated. Had the public had a reasonable opportunity
to hear both sides, the result might have been different. Because it did not, we will
never know. The problem is not that the views of the tobacco companies on the bill
were heard loud and clear. It is that the other side was effectively absent from the
television mass media.
A more recent example is Citizens for a Better Medicare, which has spent $65
million in ads opposing including a prescription drug benefit under Medicare.54
"Flo" appears and warns of the need to keep the government out of your medicine
cabinet.5 5  The ads do not tell you - nor need they do so - that Citizens for a
Better Medicare is a creation of the pharmaceutical industry.56 The ads leave out
much of the story. Because these political ads are issue ads, they are not subject to
campaign finance laws. Each time you buy a drug your doctor prescribes, you are
helping to fund such advertising - whether or not you would like prescription
drugs covered under Medicare.
Initiative and referendum elections typically pit poorly funded grass roots
coalitions against corporate-backed organizations with substantial financial
resources. Wealth disparities between the two sides are often extreme, sometimes
" Free Speech for Sale, supra note 30.
so Id.
s Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
'A The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, Citizens for
Better Medicare, available at http://appcpenn.org/issueads/citizens%20for/ better/o
20medicare.htm (last modified Aug. 2000, last visited Jan. 24, 2001).
55 Id.
56 Id.
[Vol. 10:2
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE OTHER CONSTITUTION
230 to ." A study of seventy-two ballot issues in California, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and Oregon showed that the high spending side won seventy-six percent
of the time.58 The problem with many of these issue ads and referendum ads is that
fdr too often only one side gets any meaningful hearing in the electronic square.
Such thirty-second ads often go unanswered, or those who answer are dramatically
outspent.
Another example of conflict of interest is the controversy over high definition
television. HDTV raised the question of what to do with the additional television
spectrum created by digital technology that made possible high definition television.
Some, like Robert Dole, John McCain, and William Safire, opposed simply giving
the additional spectrum to the broadcasters. (Other alternatives would be to charge
rent, demand genuine public service contributions, or - worst of all in my view -
to sell at auction.) Typically, television ignored the controversy. When Bob Dole
said you would not hear his speech protesting the giveaway on TV, he was right.
Editorials in newspaper chains with substantial television holdings favored the give
away; those without such holdings opposed it.59
Similarly, television corporations would not permit a group opposing the ethic
of consumption to purchase television time for its advertisements.' A recent
demonstration by over 1,000 people was held at a meeting of the National
Association of Broadcasters in San Francisco." The demonstrators' protest against
the National Association of Broadcasters' opposition to campaign finance reform
and low power radio was simply not reported in mainstream national press and
received little local press attention. 2
The prize-winning book Newhouse, describing the Newhouse media empire,
was rejected by many publishers who typically explained that they liked the book,
but did business with Newhouse.63 Newhouse newspapers did not review the book
or cany a syndicated column that mentioned it." Publishers were wary of taking
a later book by the same author on Dr. Benjamin Spock because of his prior book
about Newhouse. 5
"' Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness
Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391, 405 (1993), (citing
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 391 (1992)).
58 Id. (citing BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT
ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, 93-95, 198-99 (1987)).
" ALFORD, supra note 30, at 100-11.
60 Affluenza (PBS broadcast, 1997).
61 Extra! Update, Bimonthly Newsletter of FAIR, Dec. 2000, at 1.
62 id.
63 ALFORD, supra note 30, at 173.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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It is noteworthy that information about the failures of the mass media -
especially of television and radio - is not completely eliminated. One can learn
about it in very rare Bill Moyers PBS TV programs, in occasional articles in the
New York Times or Wall Street Journal, in scholarly books, or in occasional reports
in other sources. It is simply largely excluded from the mass broadcast media that
is the source of information for many Americans. As media consolidation
accelerates, partial blackouts - such as that on the Newhouse book - are likely
to be more pervasive.
If such oligopoly control of speech were decreed by the government, it would
violate the First Amendment. In those nations where the government controls
access to television and radio, we would recognize television news blackouts on
major issues as propaganda. Here such events are the product of the Other
Constitution and an ever more concentrated mass media. So we tend to accept them
without much protest and, indeed, to be blissfully ignorant of them.
It is one thing to trust citizens of a democracy to make the right choice when
they hear both sides. It is quite another to expect them to do so when one side of
the dispute dominates the dialogue. A healthy free speech system presupposes that
multiple perspectives reach the public on crucial issues. A system in which one
point of view virtually excludes or overwhelms others functions like a propaganda
system.
The growing media monopoly is resistant to change. Democrats and
Republicans alike got and continue to get large contributions from media
corporations.66 There is a stick in addition to the carrot. Local TV executives come
to Washington to lobby their elected officials, giving implicit and sometimes
explicit warnings about how the media monopolists might cover recalcitrant
congressmen. 7
Troubling as they are, these are not the only serious conflicts of interest.
Perhaps the greatest distortion of all is simply a relentless pursuit of the bottom line
with a corresponding decrease in resources devoted to serious news. The giant
media companies are removing serious political discussion from the news they
broadcast. It is replaced by crime stories (as crime goes down the TV time devoted
to it goes up), endless stories about O.J. Simpson, about Mrs. Bobbitt and her knife,
about a congressman and his missing mistress, about disasters such as the Russian
submarine, about elections described as horse races, etc.6"
News reporting on state legislatures and races for governor has virtually
disappeared from much television news and even many newspapers. In the 1998
California governor's race, local TV news on the subject was less than one-third of
66 Charles Lewis, Media Money, How Corporate SpendingBlocked PoliticalAd Reform
and Other Stories ofInfluence, CoLuM. J. REv., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 20.
67 ALFORD, supra note 30, at 100.
68 Id. at 174-82.
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one percent of possible news time - one-tenth of what it had been in 1974.69
Sixteen of nineteen top-rated TV stations in the top eleven markets broadcast, on
average, only thirty-nine seconds a night about political campaigns, while top
stations in Philadelphia and Tampa averaged six seconds a night.7" Meanwhile,
news programs are being used to promote entertainment offered by the media
companies. So the latest adventures of the survivors are reported as if they were
news.
71
All of these factors - the rise of unanswered corporate political ads that the
news media fails to discuss or question, the conflicts of interest, and the rest - are
more disturbing because of the departure they suggest from the ideal of a free press
in a democracy. In 1836, Senator John Davis of Massachusetts described the role
of a free press. He was opposing a bill designed to keep anti-slavery ideas out of
the mails:
The press is the great organ of a free people. It is the medium through
which their thoughts are communicated, through which they act upon one
another, and by which they reason with, instruct, and move each other. It
rouses us to vigilance, warns us of danger, rebukes the aspiring, encourages
the modest, and, like the sun in the heavens, radiates its influence over the
whole country. The people viewed it as vital to a republic.72
The press, he said, lets the people "know what their agents are doing and saying."73
Some insist that the Internet will save us, and the Internet has extraordinary
potential. Similar claims were once made for radio and televison. Even in the
realm of the Internet, the mass media is important. Out of the millions of web sites,
many viewers are most likely to fimd sites that are well advertised in the major
media. But at present, the Internet is a location where one can find robust and
diverse political speech.
However, all this could change. The movement to cable and the development
of new technology may allow cable companies to control what information travels
through their system. Private cable companies will claim that free speech
guarantees are not implicated because, after all, they are private companies and free
speech merely restricts the government. For most Americans, the information
superhighway may become a private road in a gated community.
Of course, the cable monopolists tell us not to worry and certainly not to
regulate. The market will solve all problems. But if fully left to market forces, for
69 Lewis, supra note 66, at 26; MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 264.
70 Lewis, supra note 66, at 26; MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 263-64.
71 MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 54-55, 56-62.
72 12 CONG. REc. 1152 (1836).
71 Id. at 1106.
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many the information superhighway will soon look a lot more like the rest of the
media. For that reason, as Internet providers, cable companies should - like
telephone companies - be treated as common carriers with a duty to carry all
comers without discrimination.74 Without any regulation to protect diversity, the
Internet may follow the path of television.
Television remains a central problem. Most campaign money goes for
television, and a great deal of money is required. Should we seek changes, and
what sorts of changes should we seek? Our constitutional history and values may
give us some guidance.
H1. THE CONSTITUTION: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND FREE SPEECH
A. The Constitution and Popular Sovereignty: "We the People of the United
States. ,
Some of our most basic constitutional ideas can be traced to a group of
seventeenth century English radicals. These people favored allowing all (or at the
very least many more) men to vote for Parliament, not simply those with substantial
wealth. They wanted parliamentary seats distributed according to population, a free
press, religious toleration, taxes in proportion to wealth, and a written constitution
that would limit the power of the government and protect individual rights. They
insisted that the people were sovereign. The people were the principal or the boss;
government officials were merely their agents. Their opponents named them the
Levellers and said that such radical ideas threatened existing wealth and power.
Suppressed in England, some ideas like those of the Levellers reappeared in
America.76
Early American constitutional documents refer to the elected officials as agents
or trustees of the people." Implicit in this rhetoric is the idea that government
7 See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a city
could not condition franchise transfer and provision of standard cable service on opening
access to its cable broadband network for competing Internet service providers); see also
Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic
Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2000); James
B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000).
71 U.S. CoNST. pmbl.
76 See HENRY NOEL BRAISFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGISH REVOLUTION (1961);
JOSEPH FRANK, THE LEVELLERS (1955); Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The
Levellers and the American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMM. 359 (1991).
7' E.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, chap. I, § IV ("That all power being originally inherent in,
and consequently derived from the people; therefore all officers of government, whether
legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to
them."), reprinted in STEPHEN B. PRESSER& JAMILS. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 106 (3d ed. 1995).
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officials have a fiduciary duty to act in the people's interest and not simply in the
interest of a powerful few. In 1774, when the delegates to the Continental Congress
listed the rights they claimed, they said "the first grand right, is that of the people
having a share in their own government by their representatives chosen by
themselves, and, in consequence, of being ruled by laws, which they themselves
approve, not by edicts of men over whom they have no controul., 7 ' Today,
according to three separate polls, over three-fourths of the respondents reported that
"Congress is largely owned by the special interest groups" which "have too much
influence" and "our present system of government is democratic in name only"
because special interests run things.79
After the great right of representative government, delegates to the Continental
Congress listed other rights - jury trial, habeas corpus, and freedom of the press
"whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and
just modes of conducting affairs."" ° These rights, they said, defend "the poor from
the rich, the weak from the powerful, the industrious from the rapacious,. . . and all
from their superiors. '
The ideals espoused by the Continental Congress ran ahead of reality, as they
always do. The original Constitution proclaimed popular sovereignty and then
attempted to limit it in many ways: the electoral college; election of senators by
state legislatures; a Supreme Court with life tenure and the (implicit) power of
judicial review; and finally an extraordinarily difficult amendment process. The
struggle for democracy has been long and uneven. Universal (white) male suffrage
was first largely realized in the United States by the 1830s, limitations on the right
to vote based on color were prohibited by the Constitution in 1870, and by 1920
limitations based on sex were prohibited. The poll tax in federal elections was
banned in 1964. Only in the late 1960s did the constitutional right of Americans of
African descent to vote become a reality. 2
Nor has progress been uniform. Many powerful voices have opposed universal
78 1 BILL OF RIGHTS, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 222 (Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1971)
[hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS].
79 E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANTZ, THE BUCKLEY STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL
STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 16 (1998). For similar poll results, see
What Americans Think, WASH. POST WEEKLY, May 17, 1999, at 34; see also DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12
(1991).
80 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 78, at 223.
81 Id.
82 See FONER, supra note 8, at 512-612 (describing the end of Reconstruction);
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 105-16 (2000) (describing the undoing of the Fifteenth Amendment).
See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65
(1998); TAYLOR BRANCH, THE PARTING OF THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954-63 (1988) (detailing the denial of black voting rights in the South).
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suffrage (or universal male suffrage) throughout our history, and American history
has witnessed both expansion and contraction of the right to vote. Women in New
Jersey lost the right to vote in the first half of the nineteenth century, as did some
African American males in the North. 3 African American males gained the right
to vote after the Civil War only to lose it in the South after the end of
Reconstruction. 4 In response to the Populist insurgency, Southern states passed
laws designed to disenfranchise not only African-Americans but also the poor. 5
Indeed, periodic attacks have been made by influential voices seeking to deprive the
poor and immigrants of the right to vote even in the twentieth century.86
B. Free Speech and Press Under the Constitition
Free speech and freedom of the press are among the brightest stars in our
constitutional constellation. One reason free speech and press occupy a central
position as fundamental rights is that they are crucial to democracy. As the Boston
Daily Advocate noted in upholding the right to engage in anti-slavery speech:
"Democracy is a principle which recognizes mind as superior to matter, and moral
and mental power over that of wealth or physical force.... Democracy is also a
principle of reform; consequently, it must examine, compare, and analyze, and how
can it do this without freedom of inquiry and discussion ....
For much of our history, free speech theory has been devoted to protecting free
speech from government suppression. That protection is crucially important. But
it is important to examine the rationale for the restriction on government
suppression of speech - the underlying function free speech was expected to
perform.
Those who opposed government suppression of ideas did so in good part
because they believed that to arrive at a correct decision, as the Levellers said, "it
will be good, if not absolutely necessary... [for public officials and the people] to
hear all voices and judgments, which they can never do, but by giving freedom to
the Press.""8 John Stuart Mill emphasized the need to protect minority opinion,
because without considering a full range of views we are unlikely to come to a wise
83 KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 54-60.
84 Id. at 105-16.
8 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 113.
86 See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at49, 68, 78-79, 91, 105-07, 112-17, 120-25,
239-40 (giving examples of attacks on universal suffrage).
87 Freedom of Discussion, BOSTON DAILY ADVOCATE, Jan. 3, 1838, at 2, quoted in
MICHAELKENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" STRUGGLES FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 234-35 (2000).
88 To the Right Honourable, the Supreme Authority of this Nation Commons ofEngland
in Parliament Assembled (1648), reprinted in LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE PURITAN
REVOLUTION 328-39 (Don M. Wolfe ed., 1967).
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decision. 9 Wise decisions, he suggested, require hearing both sides.9" The
Supreme Court has quoted a famous opinion by Justice Brandeis: the preferred
constitutional remedy is "'more speech, not enforced silence. ,,," In New York
Times v. Sullivan, the great case protecting freedom of the press, the Court said,
"the First Amendment.. . 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection."'92
If, as Robert Kuttner suggests, the campaign finance system tends to keep items
off the agenda,93 then it serves to confine political speech and democracy. It - and
how the media operates in fact - can defeat what Chief Justice Charles Evan
Hughes called "a fundamental principle of our constitutional system" - "[t]he
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people."'94
Of course, because of the nature of representative democracy in which voters
have many desires and typically only vote for a single congressman or president,
responsiveness to the will of the people will always be far from perfect. Similarly,
because of externalities and the skewed distribution of wealth, markets very
imperfectly respond to human desires. Ideology and political parties make the
divergence between votes and desires less than it otherwise might be, because
voters tend to agree with candidates and parties on a range of issues.95
There is considerable tension between these fundamental constitutional values
and the values currently represented in the Other Constitution. How shall we
respond to the fact that the Other Constitution is consolidating (and therefore
reducing) the multitude of tongues? At times in American history, influential
political leaders have expressed serious concern about the influence of the Other
Constitution on our democracy.
IV. THE OTHER CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
9 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
29 (John Gray ed., Oxford, World Classic Paperback 1991); see also LOUIS MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 440 (2001) (giving a pragmatist's
justification for free speech).
9 Id.
9' Hartlage v. Brown, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
9' New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
93 KUTrNER, supra note 26, at 347.
94 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (emphasis added); see KUTrNER,
supra note 26.
95 See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 79, at 7-8, 24-25, 29-30, 47-48, 53, 55-57.
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Recognition of the Other Constitution and the need for collective action to
regulate it to insure meaningful freedom has deep roots in American history. It is
to that part of the story that I now turn.
In the Constitutional Convention, James Madison and others warned of the
dangers of economic leveling and the dangers of paper money." The indirect
election of the Senate and the president, the two houses of Congress, and the
creation of the three branches of government were a response to the fear of abuse
of power, including fear of political power used by the poor to despoil the
wealthy.97
But when Madison saw the new government in operation, he emphasized a new
danger - domination by concentrated wealth to the detriment of republican
government. He advocated establishing "political equality among all," to avoid a
group exerting political influence out of proportion to its numbers. 98 In pursuit of
this goal, Madison now favored "withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few,
to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an
unmerited, accumulation of riches." 99 He supported "the silent operation of laws,
which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a
state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort."'0 0
Madison was concerned about the Other Constitution.
From the perspective suggested by de Tocqueville or Madison, modern debates
over whether to repeal the inheritance tax, which in any case will soon apply only
to estates worth a million dollars or more,101 tax cuts that greatly increase the wealth
of the wealthiest, antitrust laws, media concentration, and related issues are
important constitutional decisions. They are decisions about the Other Constitution.
The political coalition that might have supported more fundamental changes in
the Other Constitution was hampered by major events in American history. During
Reconstruction, African American males were given the vote in the South. For a
time, a coalition of Republicans and African Americans held political power in the
Southern states and these legislatures passed laws that affected the distribution of
wealth and power - from laws about rights of agricultural tenants to public
96 See James Madison, Speech in the Federal Convention on the Senate, in MADISON,
supra note 9, at 110-11 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
97 Id.
98 Madison, supra note 9, reprinted in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 504 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999).
99 Id. (emphasis omitted).
110 Id.; see also STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 267 (1993).
to' See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(1994), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, I.R.C. § 521 (a) (June 7,2001) (effective for estates of decedents
dying after December 31, 2001).
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education. °2 Eventually, however, African Americans were driven from the
political process, at first by Klan terrorism and later by racist laws.0 3 These events
were major assaults on both popular sovereignty and freedom of speech and
association.
During the Populist era, similar tactics (and vote fraud) were used against
Southern Populists. 1 4 Meetings were broken up and terrorism was used as a
political weapon. Indeed, the assaults on Republicans in the South and on
Populists replicated tactics used in the pre-Civil War South to keep slavery off the
political agenda.'"° Later, Southern states disenfranchised blacks by laws requiring
an ability to read and "understand" the state or national constitution, imposing poll
taxes, and establishing white-only Democratic primaries. The poll taxes and
literacy tests were also designed to disfranchise poor whites."° These events
weakened the forces of those who sought to use the power of government to reform
the Other Constitution.'0 7
At some times in American history, the Other Constitution has been closer to
the center of the political debate. Populists, some Progressives, Republican
Theodore Roosevelt, and Democrat Franklin Roosevelt raised the issue. The result
was the enactment of a number of specific reforms from the income tax amendment,
progressive taxation, and social security to the direct election of senators, initiative
and referendum in a number of states, and laws that attempted (with limited
success) to prohibit corporate contributions to political campaigns." 8
In the years after the Civil War, as business became consolidated in trusts and
corporate empires, and economic power became more centralized, many Americans
saw a new political and economic power, similar to the slave power, threatening the
independence of the small business person, the farmer, and the worker and
undermining democracy.'09 As Justice Harlan wrote in his Standard Oil dissent:
102 See FONER, supra note 8, at 364-75.
103 See e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 105-16; PAUL D. ESCoTr, MANY EXCELLENT
PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1850-1900, at 150-70 (1985).
104 See e.g., EsCoTr, supra note 103, at 241-62; C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM WATSON,
AGRARIAN REBEL 223, 235-38, 267-71 (Oxford 1968).
105 See CURTIS, supra note 87, at 281-84.
'06 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (the Alabama Constitutional
Convention of 1901 had passed provisions designed to disenfranchise poor whites as well
as blacks); KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 105-16.
107 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6-7,
62-79 (1999).
10 See generally Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1242, 1242-53 (1999) (early attempts to regulate corporate political activity).
'o See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); LINDA PRZYBYZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN
MARSHALLHARLAN 172, 182 (1999); JAMES B. WEAVER, CALLTOACTION (1892), quoted
in NORMAN POLLACK, THE JUST POLITY 63 (1987). See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
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The nation had been rid of human slavery-fortunately, as all now
feel-but the conviction was universal that the country was in real danger
from another kind of slavery sought to be fastened on the American people,
namely, the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the
hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for their own profit
and advantage exclusively, the entire business of the country, including the
production and sale of the necessaries of life." 0
To a remarkable degree, however, courts often insisted that the Other
Constitution was beyond the scope of government action. That was the view of
Lochner era jurisprudence. Though never entirely monolithic, Lochner era
jurisprudence was a constellation of restrictive theories. These theories limited
federal government power under the Commerce Clause and therefore made it
difficult to have a national, effective implementation of labor standards such as a
ban on child labor or occupational safety laws. (Industries in states that banned
child labor or insisted on safety standards faced competition from industries in
states that did not.) The Court also prevented the imposition of an income tax until
the Constitution was amended.. and it limited government ability to implement
protections for labor under the theory of "freedom of contract."
The "liberty of contract" doctrine claimed that the government should generally
be neutral in economic struggles. Of course, corporation law, property law, labor
law, tort law, and a mass of legal rules actively shaped the economic system
empowering some and dis-empowering others. But these considerations were
simply an accepted and natural part of the background. By the Lochner view, state
governments could use their police powers to protect public health, safety, and
morals (rather narrowly defined), but not to equalize the relation between employers
and employees. When vulnerable but numerous groups went to the legislature for
protection, the courts too often found the legislation invalid. Still, judges who
struck down legislation that attempted to protect the party with less economic power
also recognized that vast aggregations of economic power were threatening the
world of independent farmers and small businesses that they cherished." 2
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993); ARNOLD M. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRIsIS AND THE RULE OF
LAW: ATrrUDES OF THE BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976). On Tourgee's concerns, see
OTro H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WrNEGARToURGEE 283
(1965).
1o Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 83.
" See PAUL, supra note 109, at 159-220.
M2 The Lochner point is controversial and courts also sometimes upheld legislation. The
question, however, is not simply how many cases struck down protective laws, but how
many workers were affected by the inability to limit hours of work, or require payment in
legal tender, or pass an effective national ban on child labor, and how many laws were not
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Some large corporations in the nineteenth century paid workers in scrip
redeemable only at the company store. An excess in the supply of workers
(produced in part by government policy supported by business)' enabled
corporations to use their market power to tie one transaction - employment - to
another, a virtual requirement to shop at the company store. In this setting, the
employment contract virtually guaranteed the large corporation a monopoly on
purchases by its workers. Workers in Pennsylvania went to their state legislature,
which passed a law requiring payment in cash. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
then struck down the law as a violation of freedom of contract."4 The greater
bargaining power of the corporation - combined with the theory of freedom of
contract - allowed the corporation to impose a form of practical serfdom on its
workers and so greatly limited the worker's actual freedom of contract. But as the
Pennsylvania court saw it, this was simply not a meaningful consideration. The
Pennsylvania court refused to look at the reality of the Other Constitution." 5
The decision of the Pennsylvania court was cited with approval by the majority
of the Supreme Court in the case of Lochner v. New York." 6 Other decisions,
however, upheld the power of the legislature to protect workers, and some judges
recognized the significance of differences in economic power."'
passed as a result of perceived constitutional limitations. The Court did, at first, respond to
the claim that women needed special protection in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
a view it repudiated in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). At times, during
the Progressive era, it flirted with a more expansive view of government power. Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). It upheld limiting hours of work for miners, in light of health
concerns, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), but later ignored serious occupational
health concerns in the case of long hours for bakers. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). Some of these seemingly inconsistent results may be attributed to changes in the
personnel of the Court. For concerns that trusts with monopoly power were transforming
independent small business people into dependent servants of great corporations, see, for
example, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897); see
also Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 83. Justice Harlan was also the author of the Adair
decision.
'3 See GILLMAN, supra note 109, at 77.
"' See, e.g., Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886). Though the case was cited
with approval in Lochner v. New York (striking down a law limiting bakers to 60 hours a
week in a situation in which there were serious occupational health concerns), some judges
refused to follow it. E.g., infra note 115; see also LINDBLOM, supra note 29, at 175-77
(importance of prior determinations in shaping market transactions).
5 See Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886).
116 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63.
"7 See, e.g., Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 20 (1901) (law requiring
payment in legal tender upheld as tending toward equality between employer and employee
and calculated to promote peace); In re House Bill 147, 48 P. 512, 513 (Colo. 1897)
(legislature may script out payments to prevent oppression and fraud); see also Gulf,
Colorado, and Sante Fe R.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 166 (1897) (Gray, J., dissenting)
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The basic idea that government could not consider the realities of wealth and
power was explained by the Court in Coppage v. Kansas. "' Kansas made it a crime
to exact a promise not to join or retain membership in a labor organization as a
condition of securing or retaining employment. The Court held that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause:
Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property -
partaking of the nature of each - is the right to make contracts for the
acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal
employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money
or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily
interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the
long-established constitutional sense. The right is as essential to the
laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority
of persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by
working for money." 9
[A] little reflection will show that wherever the right of private property
and the right of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is
inevitably more or less influenced by the question whether he has much
property, or little, or none; for the contract is made to the very end that each
may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which
he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless
all things are held in common, some persons must have more property than
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth Amendment, in
declaring that a State shall not 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law,' gives to each of these an equal
sanction; it recognizes 'liberty' and 'property' as co-existent human rights,
and debars the states from any unwarranted interference with either. 2 0
Since a state could not strike down this liberty of contract directly, it also could not
(would have rejected equal protection challenge to attorney's fees granted to prevailing
plaintiffs, not to exceed $10.00, in cases against railroads). The fees were granted in cases
of claims of personal injury or property damage where the injury was $50.00 or less. The
dissent recognized the difference in the economic power of the defendant railroad and the
typical plaintiff with a small claim. See id. at 167 (Gray, J., dissenting).
"' Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 17.
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do so indirectly, "declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of
those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise, and
then invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other
object in view."' 12 In short, the state should not interfere with the inequality of
power established by the Other Constitution.
While it has been common to view the effects of wealth and the power it
confers as a fact to be studiously ignored, many Americans embraced a very
different vision. "The unholy and lawless determination to acquire wealth and
personal comfort at the expense of a weaker and less fortunate race, was the
underlying spirit of slavery,"' wrote Populist James B. Weaver. But "in the very
midst of the struggle for the overthrow of the slave oligarchy, our institutions were
assailed by another foe mightier than the former, equally cruel, wider in its field of
operation, infinitely greater in wealth, and immeasurably more difficult to
control."' 123 Weaver said, "[i]t will be readily understood that we allude to the
sudden growth of corporate power .... ,,24 "Slavery was restricted within narrow
geographical limits and the visible manifestations of the evil were repulsive....
Not so with the present foe of justice and social order. It assails the rights of man
under the most seductive guise."' 25
You meet it in every walk of life. It speaks through the press, gives zeal
and eloquence to the bar, engrosses the constant attention of the bench,
organizes the influences which surround our legislative bodies and courts
of justice, designates who shall be the Regents and Chancellors in our
leading Universities, determines who shall be our Senators, how our-
legislatures shall be organized, who shall preside over them and who
constitute the important committees. It is imperial in political caucuses;.
. has unlimited resources of ready cash, is expert in political intrigue and
pervades every community from the center to the circumference of the
Republic.' 26
Similarly, Justice John Marshall Harlan saw the rise of consolidated corporate
monopoly power as a slave power in a new form.27
121 Id. at 3.
"' POLLACK, supra note 109, at 63 (quoting WEAVER, supra note 109, at 79).
123 rd.
124 Id.
"z Id. at 76-77 (quoting WEAVER, supra note 109, at 93).
26 Id. at 77 (quoting WEAVER, supra note 109, at 93-94).
127 See PRYZBYSZEWSKI, supra note 109, at 80, 152, 182. Harlan, however, did not draw
the conclusion that the state could increase the power of labor to balance the scales. See
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1907) (striking down as a violation of the liberty of
the due process clause a statute that forbad discharging an employee because of union
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Many Progressives, like the Populists before them, rebelled against analysis that
treated corporate power and concentrated wealth as irrelevant. Running as a
candidate of the Progressive Party, former President Theodore Roosevelt said in
1912:
The only way in which our people can increase their power over the big
corporation that does wrong, the only way in which they can protect the
working man in his conditions of work and life, the only way in which the
people can prevent children working in industry or secure women an eight-
hour day in industry, or secure compensation for men killed or crippled in
industry, is by extending, instead of limiting, the power of government.
There was once a time in history when the limitation of governmental
power meant increasing liberty for the people. In the present day the
limitation of governmental power, of governmental action, means the
enslavement of the people by the great corporations who can only be held
in check through the extension of governmental power. 2'
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt sounded a similar theme in his 1936 speech accepting
the Democratic nomination for president:
For too many of us the political equality we once had won was meaningless
in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into
their own hands an almost complete control over other people's property,
other people's money, other people's labor-other people's lives. For too
many of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real .... "'
The modem progressive view is typified by the philosopher of science Karl
Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies:
Freedom... defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that
a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his
freedom. This is why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a
certain extent, so that everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody
should be at the mercy of others, but all should have a right to be protected
by the state.
Now ... these considerations, originally meant to apply to the realm of
membership). Justice Harlan hoped antitrust laws would deal with excesses of concentrated
economic power.
12 Theodore Roosevelt, Address at San Francisco (Sept. 14, 1912), in GILLMAN, supra
note 109, at 151.
129 THE ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 116 (John Gabriel Hunt ed., 1995).
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brute-force, of physical intimidation, must be applied to the economic
realm also. Even if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by
physical violence ... it may defeat our ends by its failure to protect them
from the misuse of economic power. In such a state, the economically
strong is still free to bully one who is economically weak, and to rob him
of his freedom. [U]nlimited economic freedom can be just as self-defeating
as unlimited physical freedom, and economic power may be nearly as
dangerous as physical violence; for those who possess a surplus of food can
force those who are starving into a 'freely' accepted servitude, without
using violence.... [A] minority which is economically strong may in this
way exploit the majority of those who are economically weak. 30
Popper suggested that these problems had been addressed by state regulation,
such as regulation of child labor and other labor regulations, unemployment
insurance, worker safety laws, and so on. He recognized the problem of money and
democracy, but assumed it could be solved.
There is another very different tradition in American history. It was advocated
by presidents such as Calvin Coolidge and Ronald Reagan. By this view, most
important decisions should be left to "market forces," and leaving these matters to
"market forces" will produce the best results, the greatest liberty, and the greatest
prosperity. In this view, government involvement limits rather than expands
freedom. Even those who advocate leaving decisions to the market should
recognize market forces operate in a framework of law and operate differently
depending on how the framework is set. As market forces produce great corporate
empires, those empires do what they can to shape the framework to their advantage.
With the advent of World War II, the New Deal came to an end and its tentative
efforts to deal with economic concentration were shelved. But while the New Deal
had for a time effectively enforced antitrust laws in an effort to protect consumers,
it gave less attention to another central theme of anti-monopolists in American
history - the assault of concentrated corporate power on the ability of Americans
"to govern their own lives and determine their own futures."'' After 1937, the
power of the Congress to legislate on economic matters and to consider factors such
as differences in bargaining power was clearly established. Even at its height,
however, it is far from clear that the New Deal succeeded in limiting concentration
of economic power. 3
130 2 POPPER, supra note 27, at 124-25.
131 ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR 113 (1995). See generally id. at 106-74. For an evaluation of the rise and fall of the
New Deal order from multiple perspectives, see, for example, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989).
132 See BRINKLEY, supra note 131, at 106-74.
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Progressives had enacted laws in an attempt to restrict corporate participation
in politics, laws that are far from fully effective today, and indeed probably never
were very effective.'33 But the New Deal and its successors failed to come to grips
with the problem of democratically financing elections and speech. In the end, it
*was unsuccessful in confronting issues such as free radio and television time for
candidates and for advocates of poorly financed causes that affected large segments
of the population who had a small part of the nation's wealth. It completely failed
to ensure democratic access to electronic communication by constitutional
amendment. In the end, this failure was one of its most fundamental.
V. THE PRESENT RULES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: BUCKLEY
The constitutional law of money in political campaigns in its large outlines is
fairly simple. Because of the relation of spending money to effective political
speech, the Court has struck down almost all limits on expenditures (including a
candidate's own money) that are used directly to purchase speech. 34 Because of
the danger of corruption, it has allowed limits on contributions to candidates.
Expenditures coordinated with candidates are typically treated as contributions. So
the constitutional law of campaign finance covers contributions to candidates
(which may be limited), expenditure by candidates (which may not be limited),
independent expenditures that urge voters to support a candidate but, in theory at
least, are not coordinated with the candidates (which usually cannot be limited), and
expenditures for issue ads that do not explicitly urge voters to support a candidate
and are also not coordinated with the candidate (which cannot be limited).
Of course, political ads are not simply limited to elections - as the ads against
the tobacco bill, against the Clinton health plan, and against prescription drugs
under Medicare show. Indeed, these ads represent some of the most one-sided
political speech in the electronic square.
In 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo,'35 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of key
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as amended in 1974)136
and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. 37 The Federal Election
Campaign Act limited individual contributions to any candidate to $1,000 per
election with a total per contributor limit to all candidates of $25,000."3
Independent expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" were limited
133 Winkler, supra note 108, at 1250-51.
134 Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), with Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990).
135 424 U.S. I (1976).
136 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
137 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
13' 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
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to $1,000 a year.'39 Limits were set on campaign spending by candidates for federal
offices. 40 The Act also required disclosure of contributions and expenditures above
a certain threshold.' The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act provided a
system of public funding of presidential election campaigns with a requirement that
candidates accepting public funding adhere to spending limits.'42
In Buckley, the United States* Supreme Court recognized that spending money
is crucially linked to political speech."' It said "expensive modes of
communication" such as television are "indispensable instruments of effective
political speech."'" Because expenditure of money was closely linked to political
speech, strict scrutiny of limitations was justified.'45 Still, the Court upheld the
limitation on contributions to candidates in federal elections to $1,000 per election
on the theory that there was a compelling governmental interest in avoiding the
appearance or reality of corruption."4 It struck down limitations on candidates'
expenditures and on "independent" expenditures and issue ads - ads not
coordinated with the candidate. 4 ' The Court said such expenditure limits did not
raise the same corruption issues and would dramatically limit the "quantity and
diversity of political speech."'4
The Court recognized that the $1,000 expenditure limit "relative to a clearly
identified candidate"'' 49 "would . ..exclude all citizens and groups except
candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of
the most effective modes of communication."'5 ° Such a dramatic limit on free
speech the Court rightly found unacceptable. The Court noted that the First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to political expression in order "to
assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."''
Buckley held that part of the law that limited expenditures (other than those of
candidates) relevant to federal elections to $1,000 was on its face unconstitutionally
9 18 U.S.C. § 608e (repealed 1976).
140 18 U.S.C. § 608a, (c)(1)(C-F) (repealed 1976). The Buckley Courtheld § 608(c)(1)(C-
F) unconstitutional, but made an exception for presidential candidates who accept public
funding.
141 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
142 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
141 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
'4 Id. at 19; Joel Fleishman & Pope McCorkle, Level-Up Rather than Level-Down:
Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & POL. 211, 223 (1984).
14s Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17.
,46 Id. at 27.
141 Id. at 39.
141 Id. at 19.
"' Id. at 19 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 and Supp. IV 1970)).
150 Id. at 19-20.
't' Id. at 49 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
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vague unless aided by a limiting construction. So, to avoid unconstitutional
vagueness, the Court construed the provision to apply only to express advocacy of
the election or defeat of a candidate - that is, the Court required explicit
electioneering - such as use of the words "vote for or vote against.' 5 2
(Communications not meeting the express advocacy definition are commonly
referred to as issue advocacy communications.) But as the Court noted, once the
statute was construed in this way, it would no longer effectively act to close what
would otherwise be a loophole in the law. As a result, "issue ad" election speech
could operate outside the contribution limit so long as it simply avoided urging the
voter to vote for or against a candidate and was not coordinated with the candidate.
(Only around four percent even of candidates' ads for themselves contain the magic
words.)'53 The Court still found the spending limit unconstitutional because these
independent expenditures or issue ads did not appear to pose dangers of corruption
or the sort involved in contributions.
The Supreme Court in Buckley upheld the constitutionality of the system of
voluntary presidential election expenditure limitations linked with public financing
through a voluntary income tax "checkoff."' 54 Those who accepted public funding
were required to limit their expenditures to the public funds they received. The
Court found the provision for public finance coupled with limits on spending by
those who chose to accept it to be constitutional. It noted that the Act's provisions
for public finance did not violate the First Amendment ban on "abridging" freedom
of speech or of the press because the Act was "a congressional effort, not to
abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
152 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. Many lower courts have held that these specific terms
of advocacy commonly referred to as the "magic words," are mandatory in order for a
communication to be considered express advocacy and therefore fall under the scope of
federal regulation. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 216 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2000)
(striking down a disclosure requirement triggered by speech "expressly or implicitly"
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate and finding that the Supreme Court in
Buckley had established an "express advocacy standard" to insure that campaign finance
regulations were neither too vague nor intrusive on First Amendment protected issue
advocacy); Me. Right to Life Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me.
1996) (holding that the FEC surpassed its authority when it included a "reasonable person"
standard in its definition of "express advocacy" and that the expanded standard threatened
to infringe of First Amendment protected issue advocacy), aff'dper curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (lst
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 810 (1997). But see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Furgatch,
807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding a more expansive definition of express advocacy
by including a "reasonable person" standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850, 864 (1987).
... The Brennan Center for Justice Policy Committee on Political Advertising, Five New
Ideas to Deal with Problems Posed by Campaign Appeals Masquerading as IssueAdvocacy,
5 (May 2000), athttp://www.brennancenter.org/programs/cmag-recs.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2001).
114 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
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enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a
self-governing people.""' Public finance furthered, rather than abridged, First
Amendment values. The Court also rejected a First Amendment challenge based
on the fact that some taxpayers object to providing money to a party whose views
they oppose. The Court responded by noting that "every appropriation made by
Congress uses public money in a manner to which some taxpayers object."' 56
The Court also upheld provisions for disclosure. Disclosure is a favorite
remedy suggested by those who oppose more basic reform. In fact, today we have
substantial disclosure that shows both parties are heavily dependent on
contributions from the wealthiest. Typically, in federal elections, only Republican
or Democratic nominees or occasionally candidates who are independently wealthy
have a realistic chance of success. Under present precedent, the only meaningful
democratic reform that is likely to be constitutional will involve public funding of
one sort or another.
The Supreme Court is right, of course, on a basic point. In today's world, there
is a close link between money and speech. We should be concerned with both the
"quantity and diversity" of political speech. It is right that we should seek broad
protection for political speech "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."'5 The
problem comes in connecting these ideals to the real world of political money and
democracy as they function in the post-Buckley world.
Recent developments in the area of soft money make the limits on contributions
to presidential candidates who accept public finance meaningless. Political parties
now run issue ads for party candidates funded by unlimited contributions from
corporations, unions, and wealthy (and not so wealthy) individuals. While
contributions to candidates are strictly limited, contributions to political parties for
"issue ads" (ads that promote presidential or congressional candidates, but that do
not contain the magic words "vote for or vote against") are not subject to such
limits. Soft money - money given to parties and spent for ads that do not contain
the words vote for or vote against and that in theory are not coordinated with
candidates - is replacing "hard" money. Corporations, labor unions, and wealthy
individuals now pour unlimited amounts of money into election speech, a practice
that is allowed provided they donate the money for issue advertising and it is not
coordinated with the candidate. Issue ad expenditures of the RNC or DNC on
behalf of their candidates now exceed spending by the presidential campaigns
themselves.'58
'" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
116 Id. at 92.
'" Id. at 49 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
2000 Campaign: The National Parties; Parties Playing a LargerRole in Election Ads,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at Al.
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Independent expenditures that are not made by or coordinated with the
candidate - but that contain the magic words urging voters to vote fori or vote
against a candidate - are treated as contributions and are subject to regulations
applied to Political Action Committees.' The spending of these Political Action
Committees cannot be limited, but contributions to them can be.
The present constitutional system will be replaced because it is not working.' 60
The problem is what will replace it. There is at least some danger that the new
regime will not permit any significant role for the government - beyond perhaps
disclosure - in regulation of money in elections. Public funding and free
television time may be attacked as compelled speech.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
One of the enduring puzzles of American constitutional law is how to apply
'5 PAC's, depending on their form, face various contribution limitations, and may make
independent expenditures and engage in unlimited "issue advocacy."
The generalities end here, as the form a PAC takes will effect its contribution limits.
A "multi-candidate PAC," defined by 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(3) (2001), faces a $5,000
contribution cap to federal candidates per election cycle, 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(b)(2001), and
to other PACs each year, 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(d)(2001), may make annual contributions to
national party committees not exceeding $15,000, 11 C.F.R § 1 I0.2(c)(200 1), and has a
$5,000 limitation to local and state party committees per year. A PAC that does not meet
the definition of a "multi-candidate" PAC is different in two ways: it is limited to making
contributions of $1,000 to an individual candidate, 11 C.F.R. § 110. 1(b)(2001), and may
contribute up to $20,000 a year to national party committees. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(c)(2001).
Party committees, defined by 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(4), represents a political party and is part
of the party's institutional structure. For the purposes of contribution limitations, they are
treated substantially the same as multi-candidate PACs, but there are some important
differences: (1) they may make unlimited transfers to other party committees without those
transfers being treated as "contributions"; and (2) a national party committee may contribute
up to $17,500 to a candidate for the U.S. Senate, per election cycle. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(b)
(2001). Corporation and union PACs (separate segregated funds) are basically treated like
PACs in the ordinary sense; however they may not solicit the general public, as they face
strict solicitation rules, and may have their administration and solicitation costs paid for by
the parent corporation or union. See generally 11 C.F.R. § 114 (2001). Corporations and
unions, while prohibited from contributing to federal candidates and party committees, may
make unlimited soft money contributions. Also, they may engage in limited independent
expenditures to restricted classes, see generally 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.3, 114.4 (2001), and may
engage in unlimited "issue advocacy." Candidates often have affiliated PACs, known
conventionally as "leadership PACs." From a standpoint of contribution limitations, these
are PACs in the ordinary sense, but are advantageous to a candidate since they are not
connected with their campaign accounts. (This allows a candidate to essentially "double dip"
from the same sources.)
"6 But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding limits on
contributions to candidates and citing Buckley).
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basic constitutional values when underlying circumstances change dramatically.' 6 '
When our first free speech and free press guarantee. (the First Amendment) was
written, and when our second one (the Fourteenth Amendment) was adopted, mass
communication took place through stump speeches, newspapers, books, and
pamphlets. From 1830 to 1866 most major cities had many newspapers. Putting
out a major newspaper was perhaps less expensive than it is today. Political
factions tended to have their own newspapers and to reprint articles from others.
Newspapers reported political speeches and events in Congress in great detail.
Politicians had more direct and substantial access to readers of the mass media than
they do today in our world of shrinking sound bites. 62 From 1830 to 1866,
newspaper reports of speeches by candidates or debates in Congress often covered
much of the first or second page. (Groups that rejected the dominant conventional
wisdom - the abolitionists for example - at first, had little access to the
mainstream press and responded by founding their own newspapers, printing
pamphlets, and sending out lecturers.)
Today a politician is extremely lucky if commercial television or radio news
broadcasts a few seconds from a speech or interview. 63 While ownership of the
press was widely dispersed in the years 1830 to 1866, today ownership of the mass
media is increasingly concentrated.
As the mass media have changed, it has become more difficult for politicians
and others to get a full hearing in our electronic square. The response by politicians
has been to buy the television time. Though estimates vary, commentators suggest
that at least sixty percent of campaign dollars for major races are devoted to
television ads." Expensive television time is available only to those with great
161 For a luminous discussion, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1365 (1997).
162 Local television stations aired an average of only 39 seconds per night of candidates'
words in the 30 days before primary elections in the first four months of the year 2000, with
some as low as 13 seconds (Philadelphia) or 9 seconds (Madison). What Ails Democracy?
Check Out Local TV, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, June 18,2000, at 2B. The average nightly
news sound bite for presidential candidates shrunk from 42 seconds in 1968 to 7.3 seconds
in 2000. The Political Standard, Alliance for Better Campaigns, Vol. 3, No. 8, Oct. 2000,
at 4, citing the Center for Media and Public Affairs. Candidates were able to get more time
on talk shows.
. 163 Cf., e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 264-65; see also Local TV Coverage of the
2000 GeneralElection, USC ANNENBERG SCHOOLFORCOMMUNICATION (The Norman Lear
Center Campaign Media Monitoring Project), Feb. 2001 (most television stations offer only
seconds of candidates discussing issues before elections).
"A See, e.g., Dina Bass, FCC Chair Advocates Free TV Time for Political Candidates,
DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Sept. 16, 1997 (quoting Reed Hundt); Now a Word from Your
Local Candidate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 18, 1982, at 18; The Slick Business
of Slinging Mud, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 27, 1996, at B5 (seventy to eighty percent of
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wealth at their command. So some provision to make television time more
generally available to those that lack millions of dollars in campaign funds must be
part of the solution.
As Reed Hundt and others have noted, broadcasters did not pay the Treasury
for their licenses. Instead, they agreed to use the airwaves to serve the public by
"providing access to news and information so that society and the political process
would be bettered.' 65
VII. REFORMS
Reform should be guided by three basic principles. First, it should be
consistent with ideas of popular sovereignty and free speech. It should seek to bring
us closer to the ideal (which we will never fully reach) that people should have
equal and effective voice in decisions that affect their lives and equal and effective
opportunities to put items on the agenda. 66 Second, it should be consistent with,
and bring us closer to, our First Amendment ideal of an adequate and effective
opportunity for competing perspectives to be heard. It should seek to do so, as
much as possible, by empowering more speech rather than trying to legislate less.
Third, it should recognize that, at least under current arrangements, the electronic
media - broadcasting and cable - are different both because the electronic media
are central to the problem of political money and because this media enjoys free use
of public airwaves and monopoly privileges. The high cost of television ads is the
central problem of campaign finance.
Too many reformers are insensitive to serious objections that some of their
proposed reforms would stifle free speech and potentially make the present system
even more unbalanced. Too many opponents of reform ignore the extent to which
the Other Constitution is making a mockery of the values enshrined in The
Constitution.
Attempts simply to limit the effects of money have so far been unsuccessful.
Damming up money in one place seems simply to divert it to another. Banning soft
money contributions to parties may simply result in more soft money expenditures
by other groups in the form of issue ads. Large corporate empires may simply
purchase media companies. A ban on soft money, without more, may also leave one
political party with substantially more in the way of political resources than the
other, making the system even more unbalanced.
In any case, reform at the national level is extremely difficult to achieve
because a political group that thinks it benefits most from the current arrangements
campaign funds of presidential candidates spent on television advertising).
165 Hundt, supra note 34, at 1095.
166 See DAHL, supra note 25, at 109-15 (1989); ROBERTA. DAHI, ON DEMOCRACY 37-39
(1998).
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is naturally unwilling to risk change. Requiring broadcasters to provide free access
for discussion of public issues as a condition for their use of the airwaves might
seem to be easily accomplished. Of course, there would be complex, but hardly
insurmountable, problems of defining the right of access.
In fact, broadcasters have effectively resisted and fought such public
responsibility while cheerfully accepting the billions of dollars required to pay for
television ads which have become the core of successful campaign strategy.
Broadcasters, in turn, become campaign contributors, hire lobbyists, and use their
immense political power to perpetuate the present system.'67 A president may also
appoint judges who will interpret The Constitution to entrench the status quo
currently reflected in the Other Constitution. These facts suggest a possible role for
direct action - use by the people of their free speech and association rights to force
change. The right to engage in a boycott to produce political and social change is
ordinarily protected by the guarantees of the First Amendment. 6 Whether direct
action can work will depend on the intensity of public concern and on public
willingness to protest. It will also depend on whether the present system of highly
concentrated mass communication (or some other alternative channel of
communication) can be effectively used to mobilize public action or whether the
media empires could effectively filter out dissent aimed at the media itself.
A. Direct Action - The Television Tea Party
Most political money is spent on thirty-second TV spots. Politicians spend
more and more money on TV in an effort to get their message out. Meanwhile,
commercial TV news devotes little time to serious political discussion and reports
less and less of what politicians are actually saying. NBC and the Murdoch Fox
networks did not even carry the first Bush-Gore presidential debate. 69 At the same
time, the media monopolists collect an estimated billion dollars for political ads and
more for issue ads. Efforts at reform are stalled in Congress, with media empires
leading the charge against free TV time for candidates. 7 Members of Congress,
unfortunately, are afraid of the media monopolists who control whether and how the
candidates will appear in the news.
When colonial Americans believed that their system of representative
' See Lewis, supra note 66, at 20, 26; MCCHESNEY, supra note at 30, at 263-64.
168 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). But see FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
169 See Lisa de Moraes, Fox Puts Politics in Its Place, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at C1;
Steve Marantz, Networks Pit Debate Against New Sci-Fi Show, Baseball, BOSTON HERALD,
Oct. 3, 2000, at 5. Fox carried "Dark Angel" instead, and NBC carried baseball but gave
local stations the option of carrying the debate. Fox later provided an hour of free air time
to the candidates.
' Lewis, supra note 66, at 20, 26; MCCHESNEY, supra note 30, at 263-64.
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government was threatened by taxes imposed by a distant Parliament in which they
had no voice, they politely asked Parliament to repeal the tax. Parliament refused
to listen. Then the colonists organized a boycott of British tea and other products.
The Boston Tea party symbolized the spirit of the boycott.
Some Americans have politely asked television networks to do their part to
respond to the current crisis in representative government. A group called Alliance
for Better Campaigns (led by former Presidents Ford and Carter and Walter
Cronkite) has suggested a modest beginning. It has called on television stations and
networks, in the thirty days before an election, to devote five minutes a night to
broadcasting what candidates say - up from a total of forty seconds typically
provided to all candidates.
The public has given television a license to use the public airways and has
provided a monopoly for cable and has not charged for the privilege. A
contribution to democracy seems a small price to ask. Only seven percent of local
stations agreed to a proposal for devoting five minutes per night to, candidate
centered discourse in the thirty days prior to the elections. 7 ' Those that agreed
averaged two minutes and seventeen seconds per night compared to an average of
forty-five seconds per night by stations that did not agree.12 People might decide
it is time for a television tea party.
Rather than dumping their TV sets in the nearest harbor, people could simply
turn off those stations and networks that refuse to provide substantial time for
candidates. They could also let the holdouts know they have done so. People might
also advertise the cause by picketing local television stations and network
headquarters. It would be interesting to see if the protests make it onto the evening
news.
The media monopolists are in the business of selling viewers to advertisers. If
they lose lots of viewers, they will lose lots of advertisers, and then they might take
their duty of public service more seriously. Some will complain that television is
being singled out. But for good reason: it has been given huge public resources for
free, and its level of public service has steadily declined.
If people feel it is too great a sacrifice to turn off all non-participating
commercial TV at once, they could proceed as the auto workers union does. They
could boycott at least one holdout network and station at a time. They could let
them (and some advertisers) know they have done so. (It would be most effective
to act during Sweeps Week when the television ratings, and therefore advertising
revenues are set.) Then if an agreement is reached with one, people could move on
' Local TV Coverage of the 2000 General Election, USC ANNENBERG SCHOOL FOR
COMMUNICATION (The Norman Lear Center Campaign Media Monitoring Project), Feb.
2001, at 1, 9, 15. Fifty-five percent of political stories aired were devoted to strategy, horse
race, etc. See id. at 9.
172 Id.
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to the next. (The TV Tea Party was not endorsed by the Alliance for Better TV, but
the website - www.greedytv.org - provided an up-to-date list of participating
stations and holdouts and an easy way to send an e-mail.)
Weaning ourselves and our children from commercial TV even for a brief time
would be a formidable task. People could talk with their children, tell them what
is at stake, and ask for their help and in doing so might help to educate their
children on the dangers and shortcomings of our highly concentrated advertising
driven electronic media.
American revolutionaries risked their lives for representative government. Civil
rights workers who went to Mississippi and other parts of the deep South during the
1960s voting rights drive risked their lives for democracy, too. Massive nonviolent
direct action helped restore democracy to Chile and Serbia. Like the Boston Tea
Party and the refusal of Rosa Parks to sit in the back of the bus, the TV Tea Party
would be a small first step. But great movements start with small steps. If it could
be successful - admittedly a large if - direct action could change the attitude of
the broadcast empires to legislative and constitutional reform.
Before a boycott like the Television Tea Party could enjoy significant success,
a substantial minority would need to agree that a media better designed to support
the democratic process is a crucial goal. These people would have to overcome
cynicism and believe that positive change is possible. On that score the work of
Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference is instructive. Gladwell shows how a relatively small number of people
without huge advertising budgets can and do effect social change.'
Direct action alone is not enough. The most effective protests - the sit-in
movement, the movement for abolition of slavery, the struggle for voting rights for
Americans of African descent in the South - were effective precisely because they
resulted in legal changes, including in some cases constitutional amendments. All
required a commitment that went far beyond simply voting on election day.
B. Governmental Action to Empower More Speech
A crucial reform would be to require free television time for political candidates
and initiative and referendum campaigns. Another would be to provide some form
of public financing for candidates. Such reforms are far from ideal; they would
require a system for determining which candidates qualify for funds. But reform
should be compared not to the ideal, but to the present system.
Because of the Buckley decision, public finance is probably one of the few truly
effective campaign finance reforms that can work under the current legal regime.
It has been enacted by large majorities of voters in states as diverse as
' MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LrTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
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Massachusetts, Maine, and Arizona, but was recently defeated in Oregon." 4 More
difficult, because criteria for selection would be more problematic, would be
provision for free air time for multiple perspectives on issues.
Basically, under these state reforms, candidates qualify by raising a certain
amount in small contributions. After qualifying, the candidate is typically required
to forgo private funds - though some systems allow both public and private funds.
Some, like Maine, give candidates extra funds up to twice the original amount when
they are outspent by opponents or independent expenditures. The problem, of
course, is that issue ads can still be used to produce a remarkably one-sided
discussion. A similar rule could perhaps be applied to such issue ads - carefully
defined. (In any case, some system needs to be devised to fund something beyond
one-sided discussion of the issues raised by issue ads.)
Reforms need to be crafted with care so that they do not unreasonably
disadvantage third party candidates. One way would be to allow immediate
matching funds for money raised by minor party candidates in relatively small
contributions. Another would be to provide some of the public funding in the form
of vouchers that citizens could donate to candidates of their choice for use in
broadcast time that would be free to the candidate.
Vouchers or small contributions could be used for issues as well. Perhaps the
best reform would be a mixed system of public finance provided in the form of
direct cash payment to candidates and vouchers, and aid to candidates in the form
of free broadcast time. Vouchers have the advantage of decentralizing decisions
about how public funds should be distributed and are the most nimble system in
terms of promptly adapting to new parties and candidates. They also raise the
specter of a black market and the problem of how candidates will raise the funds to
alert potential supporters to donate their vouchers to them.
The metaphor for a system of democratically financed elections should be the
public forum as conceived by the Court in the 1930s and 1940s. Then the Court
emphasized the importance of opening channels of free speech to the poorly
financed causes of ordinary people.' In a series of cases beginning in the late
1930s, the Court held that public streets, sidewalks, and parks are public fora. They
were natural and proper places that citizens have a right to use for free speech.'76
Similarly, we should conceptualize voluntary public finance of elections with
some additional funds for candidates who are outspeit by those who refuse public
funding as a sort of limited public forum dedicated to free speech on matters of
1'74 Dave Hogan, Political Action Committees Set Legislative Table, THE OREGONIAN,
April 5, 2001, at Al.
175 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145 (1943).
176 See, e.g., Follet v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Martin, 319 U.S. at
145; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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public concern. Another part of the public forum would be a provision for a
required slice of commercial broadcasting for political speech.
The justification for granting special privileges to broadcasters has been that
they will perform public service in return. We should frankly recognize that
television and cable have failed to live up to their side of the bargain. The public
should reclaim a segment (scattered effectively throughout the day) of what has
been given as a limited forum for candidates, advocates of ballot measures, and
issue discussion.
Neutral criteria should be used to determine a right to access. (Criteria for
candidates and ballot measures would be comparatively easy; those for issue
discussion quite difficult.) While fixed slices of the broadcast day would be
returned to the public, in the remainder of the air time broadcasters could be treated
as having full First Amendment rights. A requirement that a portion of this public
grant be set aside for a competitive discussion of public issues is a small price to
ask. If television networks had been required to provide $500 million a year of free
television time for candidates (the amount spent by all candidates in 1996), the
amount would be less than two percent of the annual advertising revenues of
television broadcasters. 7 "
Another crucial reform would be preventive medicine. It would seek to ensure
adequate and equal access to Internet transmitted by cable. In its capacity as an
Internet provider, the cable company should be treated like a common carrier, like
the phone company.
The electronic public forum and public finance should provide substantial
access to candidates. For example, candidates who raise a certain amount in small
contributions (including from vouchers) or perhaps who enjoy something like two
percent in support in public opinion polls should be provided at least some access
and funding in proportion to support. (This would help avoid the chicken-and-egg
problem of the candidate who cannot get on TV because she has small support and
has small support because she cannot get on TV.) Ideally, there should be several
alternative routes to access because alternatives will be harder to gerrymander.
The public forum doctrine was created by the courts. Here the role of the Court
would be more modest - simply to allow the legislature to act in the direction of
greater democracy and more diversity of free speech. In the end, to be secure, a
public right of access to the mass media for political candidates would require
protection by constitutional amendment. Such a result seems quite unlikely in
present circumstances, but, of course, activists can help to change circumstances.
All proposed reforms will face difficult constitutional challenges. But if prior
Supreme Court precedent is a reliable guide and the Court adheres to its holdings
that broadcasting is different, there is a strong case for providing candidate
'7 Hundt, supra note 34, at 1106.
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access."'7 Media giants have been given a limited and incredibly valuable public
resource - the right to use the airwaves for television and radio. They will say that
requiring free television time for candidates who meet basic criteria is a taking of
private property for public use without compensation or that it is impermissible
compelled speech.' (The present system of turning these resources over to the
media companies with nothing required in return seems to involve taking public
property for private use without compensation.)
Some, like George W. Bush, insist that providing government funds to
candidates is wrong because it forces people to fund ideas with which they
disagree. 8 ° Judges steeped in laissez faire theory may embrace such an argument.
It is essentially a revival of Lochner era jurisprudence. Of course, public finance
for candidates who choose it (and who qualify based on neutral and broad criteria)
is a form of subsidized speech, but so is any public forum or general subsidy to
speech. In the public forum everyday we are subsidizing speech with which we
disagree. We also have a long and worthy history of a postal subsidy for
newspapers and magazines.' 8 ' We continue to grant public resources for private
speech by virtue of the monopoly use of the public airwaves granted to television
and radio.
Of the many objections to reform, I will mention two that should be rejected.
The first contends that reformers have a particular vision of popular sovereignty and
free speech that motivates their proposals. But, the objection says, the First
Amendment does not permit the government to select any correct visions.
Therefore, reforms are impermissible. 82
78 E.g., CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,396 (1981); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 389 (1969). But see, e.g., LILLIAN R. BEVIER, Is FREETV FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES
CONSTITUTIONAL? 33-34,46(1998) (arguing that requiring broadcasters to "provide free TV
time would restrict their free speech rights). See generally Polashuk, supra note 57. For a
discussion see David Chang, Selling the Market Driven Message: Commercial Television,
Consumer Sovereignty, and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REv. 451 (2000).
'79 Cf Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute requiring
a newspaper to print a reply by a candidate it attacked struck down).
180 See George W. Bush for President, Official Site, at http://www.bush2000.com
/issues.asp? (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
181 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
12 Cf Sullivan, supra note 12, at 681: "[Ihe 'anti-corruption' argument for campaign
finance reform claims the superiority of a particular conception of democracy as a ground
for limiting speech. As a result, it runs squarely up against the presumptive ban on political
viewpoint discrimination." This rationale does not squarely apply to free television time or
increased public finance. Professor Sullivan suggests other potential problems including
claims of compelled speech. See id. at 670 n.30. As Lucas A. Powe, Jr. has shown, the
license renewal system and even connecting the license to fairness in presentation of public
issues has raised serious problems of partisan manipulation. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987). Treating a fixed portion of
the air time as a political "park" (beyond the power of the broadcaster to control) and leaving
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The First Amendment does not permit the government to select a correct vision
and proscribe advocacy of others. But that is a very different thing from saying that
the First Amendment precludes any governmental arrangements that affect speech
in the electoral system. In its extreme form, the claim that government may not
embrace particular theories argues that the government may not subsidize speech
to facilitate broader discussion. Of course, the public forum in parks, streets, and
sidewalks does just that.
As Buckley correctly noted, the First Amendment forbids abridging speech, not
facilitating it.'83 The First Amendment cannot be and is not fully neutral. Indeed,
"[t]he First Amendment. . . 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection."" 8 That is a particular vision.
But the basic fallacy is deeper. There is simply no way in which a political
system can be designed that does not select some approach to the problem of
political speech. The argument that the First Amendment precludes such choices
as public subsidy for political speech really asserts that the First Amendment has
made an authoritative choice - speech in the mass media must be rationed based
on wealth created in part by government largesse. But nothing in the First
Amendment says that. Furthermore, the government has already rationed mass
media speech through broadcasting and cable licenses. The argument claims that
it may not require a certain portion of the monopoly it has allowed in return for
public service to be devoted to free political time. This is merely to assert one
authoritative vision of the First Amendment as opposed to another - one that
asserts that wealth should be able to monopolize speech in the mass media. That
vision is one that is, in light of modem reality, less well adapted to furthering the
underlying policies the amendment seeks to advance.
A related argument has been advanced by the American Civil Liberities Union
in its attack on the Maine Campaign Reform statute adopted by the state's voters.
One aspect of that statute granted extra public funds to a candidate who selected
public finance and who was outspent by a candidate who did not or who was
outspent by independent expenditures. The effect of the statute was to increase
resources to a publicly financed candidate - up to twice the original grant - so the
publicly financed candidate could respond to speech from those who rejected public
finance.
The complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union alleged that such
additional funds to match the expenditures of an opponent who rejected public
the broadcaster otherwise freer of government oversight may be a way to respond to these
quite valid concerns.
's See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
18 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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finance violated the First Amendment. This was because the effect would be to
discourage speech by the wealthier candidate who would be aware that his
additional speech, beyond the amount provided for public finance, would produce
a publicly funded response by the publicly financed candidate. The effect, the
complaint alleged, would be to encourage spending limits that could not be
constitutionally required.'85 This would be so because a candidate's enthusiasm for
speaking would be chilled by knowing that the additional speech could be answered
by a publicly financed opponent.
Simply providing a candidate additional opportunities to speak when outspent
- opportunities that can never exceed and may not even equal those of the
opponent - should not be seen as abridging speech. Freedom of speech does not
provide the wealthy with a basic right to be protected against counter speech that
benefits from a viewpoint-neutral subsidy - a subsidy available to any similarly
situated candidate who accepts public finance. In effect, the government here
simply enhances the debate, as is done by provisions for equal time for parties to a
typical debate.
To argue that wealth has a right not to be deterred by the possibility of an
effective response is to reincarnate Lochner era jurisprudence with a vengeance.
Coming from the ACLU, which has contributed much to American liberty, such an
185 See ACLU complaint in Daggett, ACLU, et al v. Bernier, et al complaint in the Maine
District Court. The full complaint was available on the ACLU web site. Paragraphs 5 and
10 of the complaint alleged:
5. Non-participating candidates are also put in the unconstitutional position of
either curtailing their own speech or effectively subsidizing their "clean"
opponent's speech.... Thus, once the matching subsidy is triggered, the "clean"
candidate is released from the spending limit that was initially imposed, and
the MCEF provides additional funds to thwart any attempt by a
non-participating opponent to deliver his or her message by outspending a
"clean" candidate. (The only limit on the amount of the matching subsidy is
that it cannot exceed 200 percent of the initial payment from the MCEF.)
10. Because of the manner in which the MCEF provides matching subsidies to
"clean" candidates, candidates who choose not to accept public financing (or
who fail to qualify) are effectively penalized for raising or spending money
beyond the amount their "clean" opponents initially receive from the MCEF.
Non-participating candidates will be far less likely to spend additional money
knowing that matching payments will be made to their "clean" opponents.
Conversely, by engaging in additional speech, non-participating candidates
effectively will be underwriting the speech of their "clean" opponents. Maine
will thus have accomplished indirectly what the Supreme Court has held that
Maine cannot do directly, namely, impose spending limits on candidates for
elected public office.
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argument is especially unfortunate. Happily, the argument was rejected by the
District Court and the First Circuit. 18
6
In his study, The Right to Vote, historian Alexander Keyssar has noted the long
opposition to universal suffrage by many with extraordinary wealth and power. As
Keyssar notes, "the current debate over campaign financing... can be viewed as
the latest battle in the two-centuries-old war over the democratization of politics in
the United States; at the moment, anti-democratic forces are winning that battle, and
in so doing, are undercutting the achievement of universal suffrage."' 7
This article obviously is far from an exhaustive or definitive examination of the
problems it examines. It seeks to focus attention on issues too often neglected and
to sketch some possible responses. I hope it will encourage others to craft wise
solutions.
The expansion and democratization of opportunities to speak is not a complete
solution to the campaign fimance-free speech conundrum. It fails fully to respond
to the threat that large contributions pose to the fiduciary relation of politicians to
the public. But it is a start, and a perfect solution may not be possible.
. The Society of Friends has the practice of propounding queries - questions
that deserve serious reflection. So I will close with a series of queries.
1. How can we modify our system so it does more to advance government of, by,
and for all the people of our nation?
2. If "expensive modes of communication" such as television are "indispensable
instruments of effective political speech,"' 8 how can we modify our system so as
to make these indispensable instruments more widely and democratically available?
3. How can we do more to promote a system of freedom of expression to "'assure
the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people'? 89
"" The claim was rejected in Daggett v. Webster, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000). One
court has adopted the matching-equals-chilling rationale in the case of independent
expenditures. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994). The District Court in Day
had held that the trigger provision enhances First Amendment rights and causes no First
Amendment injury. In Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), Rosenthiel v.
Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996), and Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D.
Ky. 1995), statutes that provided triggers for additional spending by publicly financed
candidates when their opponents outspent them were upheld. The Wilkinson and Rodriguez
courts said the trigger plans in those cases promoted First Amendment values or promoted
more, not less, speech. See also Triggering the First Amendment: Why Campaign Finance
Systems that Include "Triggers" Are Constitutional," 24 J. LEGIS. 223 (1998).
187 KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 322-23.
,88 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19; Fleishman & McCorkle, supra note 144, at 211, 223.
I' Id. at 49 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,266 (1964)). Theories
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4. How can we do more to craft a system that accords with "the First Amendment
... 'presuppos[ition] that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection."'?'"
5. If we do not have these things, what, if anything, should we do about it?
A democracy committed to free speech cannot safely ignore concentrations of
private power and how these concentrations effect democratic and free speech
ideals. It must not ignore the effect of the Other Constitution on the one that
promises free speech and democracy.
suggesting the impossibility of popular sovereignty as a device for collective democratic
choice are discussed in KUTrER, supra note 26, at 333-42.
'9 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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